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South Korean economic performance over the last four decades has been
nothing short of spectacular. During this period the country experienced
only two years of negative growth—1980, in the wake of the second oil
shock and the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, and 1998, in the
midst of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis (ﬁgure 10.1). Between the initiation of a
wide-ranging economic reform program by Park in 1963 and the ﬁnancial
crisis in 1997, real per capita income growth measured in purchasing
power adjusted terms averaged more than 6 percent annually, and per
capita income stood at more than eight times its level when reforms began.
According to the Penn World Tables, at the start of that period the coun-
try’s income level was lower than that of Bolivia and Mozambique; by the
end it was higher than that of Greece and Portugal.1
Most economists would probably subscribe to the rough notion that
more complete markets are preferable to less complete markets. In the case
of ﬁnancial markets, there is a large theoretical and empirical literature
supporting the notion that the development of local ﬁnancial markets and
their integration into international markets encourages a variety of desir-
able outcomes. Yet during its period of rapid growth, South Korea delib-
erately eschewed the purported gains of international ﬁnancial integration
and instead maintained extensive controls on international capital ﬂows as
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1. South Korea was “deceptively poor” in the 1950s, in that per capita income was unusu-
ally low relative to human capital (Noland and Pack 2002, table 2.1), a situation presumably
explained in large part by the destruction of much of the physical capital stock during the Ko-
rean War (1950–53). That said, South Korea also accumulated human capital extremely rap-
idly relative to other large developing countries of that era (Noland and Pack 2002, ﬁgure 2.3).part of a more general policy of ﬁnancial repression undertaken in the con-
text of a state-led development strategy. In other words, rapid sustained
growth occurred in the presence of capital controls for a period of several
decades. This is not to argue that capital controls were causal: this paper
will not speculate on the counterfactual of what South Korean economic
performance might have been under a diﬀerent policy package, but will
simply acknowledge that this period of rapid growth coincided with the ex-
istence of capital controls, and that these controls and the delinking of do-
mestic and international ﬁnancial markets was an essential component of
the country’s state-led development strategy.
Problems arose as the country approached the international technolog-
ical frontier and opportunities for easy technological catch-up began to
erode. The disappearance of straightforward paths for industrial upgrad-
ing based on imitating the prior trajectories of more advanced economies
put a heightened premium on the ability of corporate managements and
their ﬁnanciers to discern emerging proﬁt opportunities. The old develop-
ment strategy was no longer adequate, but decades of state-led growth had
bureaucratized the ﬁnancial system and created a formidable constellation
of incumbent stakeholders opposed to liberalization and transition toward
a more market-oriented development model. As rents dissipated, both ﬁ-
nancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms scrambled to claim the dwindling low-
hanging fruit.
Under these conditions, the liberalization undertaken in the early 1990s
was less a product of textbook economic analysis than of parochial poli-
ticking. A combination of South Korean policy, its accession to the Orga-
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Fig. 10.1 South Korean real GDP growth, 1961–2003
Source: World Development Indicators 2004.nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the
Basel Accords on capital adequacy created unintended incentives for
short-term bank borrowing. The highly leveraged nature of the South Ko-
rean economy, together with the currency and term mismatches embodied
in the mid-1990s surge of foreign debt exposure, left the economy vulner-
able to a variety of negative shocks, and in 1997, in the context of the
broader Asian upheaval, South Korea experienced a ﬁnancial crisis with
net cleanup costs that eventually amounted to 16 percent of 2001 gross do-
mestic product (GDP).2 The South Korean case is interesting precisely be-
cause it combines in an unparalleled manner the characteristics of sus-
tained success, capital controls, and ﬁnancial crisis.
To preview the conclusions of this paper, capital controls were a neces-
sary component of the state-led development process. The problem is that
it is diﬃcult to transition out of the state-led model—interventions create
their own constituencies, and the 1990s liberalization was a function of po-
litical competition among domestic ﬁnancial and corporate institutions
over declining rents and foreign ﬁnancial service providers seeking to en-
ter the South Korean market.
Two concerns were expressed contemporaneously in South Korea about
capital account liberalization—that it would adversely aﬀect incumbent
South Korean ﬁnancial service ﬁrms and that it could be macroeconomi-
cally destabilizing. Systemic risk was suﬃciently high that South Korea
might well have experienced a ﬁnancial crisis regardless of capital account
liberalization; the liberalization program aﬀected the timing, magnitude,
and particulars of the crisis.
The degree of ﬁnancial market integration between South Korea and the
rest of the world is considerably higher as a result of the crisis-driven re-
moval of capital controls. Yet the “dumbing down” of the ﬁnancial system
produced by decades of ﬁnancial repression may have left lingering eﬀects.
South Korea seems to have emerged from the crisis relatively successfully,
but concerns remain, largely centering on the apparent diﬃculty of chang-
ing the lending culture of until recently bureaucratized ﬁnancial institu-
tions and the counterpart challenge of improving the quality of market-
oriented ﬁnancial oversight by regulators more experienced in systems of
greater direct command and control. In the speciﬁc historical and political
circumstances of South Korea, whether the use of capital controls could
have been separated from the more general policy of ﬁnancial repression
and more dynamic domestic ﬁnancial markets fostered in their presence is
an open question.
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2. In these regards, the South Korean case is similar to those of Japan and Taiwan, which
also combined state-led growth and capital controls, and in the 1990s experienced ﬁnancial
crises costing double-digit shares of GDP.10.1 Historical Context
South Korea inherited a legacy of ﬁnancial repression from Japanese
colonial occupation (1910–45) that carried into the period of independ-
ence (1948), reﬂecting the dirigiste character of Japanese colonial adminis-
tration and the continuation of extensive controls by the U.S. military au-
thorities in the immediate postwar period. A continuing theme throughout
South Korean economic history has been the critical role of the state, its
role in the generation of rents, and the politicization of their distribution,
starting with the ﬁrst postcolonial president of South Korea, Rhee Syng-
Man, who exploited the policy-generated rents to build political power.3
According to S. Cho (1994), South Korean economic policy was aimed at
maximizing the value of American aid in the aftermath of the Korean War
(1950–53), which had left the country devastated, and the ensuing Cold
War standoﬀ. Aid ﬁnanced most capital accumulation and, at its peak in
the late 1950s, more than half of imports (ﬁgure 10.2).
A military government led by General Park Chung-Hee took control in
1961. As shown in ﬁgure 10.3, when Park seized power, gross domestic sav-
ing net of aid was derisory. Gross investment, ﬁnanced mostly by aid, stood
at a bit more than 10 percent of GDP, and the current account was in rough
balance. After two years of poor economic performance, the military gov-
ernment uniﬁed the existing multiple exchange rate system, devalued the
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3. See Cargill (1999) for a comparison of the Japanese and South Korean ﬁnancial systems.
See Jones and SaKong (1980) and Woo (1991) for examples of the use of state-derived rents
for political power building.
Fig. 10.2 Foreign aid to South Korea, 1953–73
Sources: Collins and Park (1989); World Bank’s World Development Indicators; Bank of 
Korea.currency, and initiated a series of wide-ranging reforms. After a brief ex-
periment with ﬂoating, the currency was pegged to the U.S. dollar, and it
would remain so until 1980 (Koo and Park 1990). Domestic saving net of
aid began rising rapidly (looking at ﬁgure 10.3, one can understand why
development economists adopted Rostow’s take-oﬀ metaphor). Domestic
investment began rising even faster.
While in some ways Park’s reform package marked a fundamental de-
parture from past practices (with respect to trade policy, for example), it re-
tained an important role for the state in the development process. Perva-
sive regulatory entry barriers (and thus protection from competition for
incumbents), and Park’s penchant for sole-sourcing important infrastruc-
tural and other large-scale government-supported projects, in eﬀect so-
cialized risk and created opportunities for cross-subsidization across
diﬀerent business ventures, encouraging the chaebol (family-dominated
conglomerates) to diversify into otherwise unrelated lines of business. By
the 1980s, the top ten chaebol accounted for more than 20 percent of na-
tional income (SaKong 1993, table A.20). Bank of Korea independence
was ended and the Bank made subservient to the Ministry of Finance and,
ultimately, the Blue House.
The accumulation of capital contributed to rapid technological upgrad-
ing and a stunning transformation of the composition of output. In 1963
nonfuel primary products accounted for more than half of South Korea’s
exports, and human hair wigs were the third leading item. A decade later
South Korea’s exports were dominated by manufactures such as textiles,
electrical products, and iron and steel; only one primary product category,
ﬁsh, made the top ten. As seen in ﬁgure 10.3, capital accumulation was ﬁ-
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Fig. 10.3 South Korean savings and investment, 1960–2003
Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System and World Development Indicators 2004.nanced primarily by growing domestic saving, augmented by a signiﬁcant
inﬂow of saving from abroad, reaching nearly 10 percent of GDP in 1971,
and actually breaching this threshold in 1974 after the ﬁrst oil shock.
These inﬂows predominately took the form of long-term loans and trade
credits from private lenders and public institutions (including the multilat-
eral development banks) all subject to Bank of Korea regulation (ﬁgure
10.4). Portfolio inﬂows and inward foreign direct investments were negli-
gible during this period. A substantial academic literature exists (e.g.,
Westphal, Rhee, and Pursell 1981; Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman 1985)
that attempts to understand the sources of South Korean industrial com-
petence and that documents the varied forms of technological transfer and
interaction between South Korean and foreign ﬁrms. Figure 10.4 indicates
that whatever the origins of South Korean technical mastery, much of the
foreign capital arrived in the form of technologically disembodied loans.
In 1972, Park, who had been reelected for a third term, pushed through
the Yushin (Revitalization) Constitution, which in essence made him pres-
ident for life. For a variety of reasons, he initiated the intensive promotion
of heavy industry through what came to be known as the Heavy and Chem-
ical Industry (HCI) policy. Modest ﬁnancial-sector liberalizations that had
been undertaken in the late 1960s were reversed in 1972, when interest rates
were lowered and direct government control of the banking system was in-
creased in order to channel capital to preferred sectors, projects, or ﬁrms
(ﬁgure 10.5). In order to ﬁnance large-scale projects, special public ﬁnan-
cial institutions were established, and private commercial banks were in-
structed to make loans to strategic projects on a preferential basis. By the
late 1970s, the share of these “policy loans” had risen to 60 percent (J.-H.
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Fig. 10.4 Composition of capital inﬂows, 1962–2003
Sources: Park (1984); IMF Balance of Payments Statistics; Collins and Park (1989); Bank of
Korea Economic Statistics System; World Development Indicators2004; author’s calculations.
Note: Portfolio investment is assumed to be zero from 1962 to 1973.Yoo 1994). These loans carried, on average, negative real interest rates, and
the annual interest subsidy grew from about 3 percent of gross national
product (GNP) in 1962–71 to approximately 10 percent of GNP on aver-
age between 1972 and 1979 (Pyo 1989).4With such a large share of national
income at stake, the allocation of these highly subsidized loans became the
focus of intense political activity.
Park was assassinated in 1979 during what amounted to a palace coup.
General Chun Doo-Hwan and his fellow oﬃcers more or less stumbled
into power, driven more by intramilitary rivalries and narrow career inter-
ests than by any real sense of where they wanted to take the country
(Cliﬀord 1997). Facing deteriorating economic performance, which was
exacerbated by the second oil shock, Chun and his cronies turned to West-
ern-trained economic technocrats, who were already attempting to intro-
duce a stabilization policy and reverse the worst excesses of the HCI pol-
icy, to ﬁx the economy and shore up the generals’ political legitimacy.5
Despite at times carrying a large volume of ﬁxed-interest loan debt,
South Korea managed to avoided ﬁnancial trouble until the early 1980s
slowdown in global growth in the wake of the second oil shock. The exter-
nal shocks that hit South Korea during the period 1979–1981 were actually
larger than those experienced by a number of other countries discussed at
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Fig. 10.5 Real interest rates
Source: D. Cho and Koh (1996).
4. The deﬁnition of “policy loans” is imprecise, and various sources report signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent ﬁgures. See S. Cho (1994) for discussion, and see SaKong (1993, tables A.18–A.19)
and Krueger and Yoo (2002) for alternative calculations.
5. Chun literally scheduled early-morning tutoring sessions. Perhaps there is something pe-
culiarly Korean about this: it is hard to imagine the typical military dictator staying up late to
study for his daily economics lesson.this conference, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Balassa
1985, table 1). Although external debt and debt service ratios had increased
substantially in the late 1970s, South Korea was able to re-attain high sus-
tained growth by 1983, more rapidly than its comparators, through a com-
bination of a reduction in imports associated with a sharp, though brief,
decline in income, together with real exchange rate depreciation achieved
through a 20 percent nominal devaluation. (The currency had also been
devalued by 20 percent in 1974 following the ﬁrst oil shock.) This pattern
of relatively a sharp income decline and real depreciation followed by rapid
recovery was to be repeated in the 1997 crisis (J.-W. Lee and Rhee 2000).
The technocrats around Chun implemented a policy of macroeconomic
stabilization, through which they began to liberalize and deregulate the
South Korean economy. A liberalization of the ﬁnancial sector initiated
under the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1982–86) and extended under the Sixth
Five-Year Plan (1987–91) attenuated “policy lending.”
10.1.1 Domestic Finance
The capital channeling development strategy pursued up through the
1980s rested on the twin pillars of ﬁnancial repression and capital controls
to delink the domestic and international ﬁnancial markets. The govern-
ment had to limit capital markets to institutions that could be dominated
if not controlled, and it had to limit the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing options to those
institutions. At the core was a positive list system through which anything
not explicitly permitted was prohibited. This hampered the introduction of
new instruments throughout the ﬁnancial sector. In practice this meant
emphasizing indirect ﬁnance and maintaining limitations on foreign par-
ticipation in ﬁnancial markets and domestic ﬁrms’ access to foreign capi-
tal. Presumptively less compliant foreign banks could not be allowed into
the market in any signiﬁcant way, for if they were allowed to establish a sig-
niﬁcant presence, they would undermine domestic banks operating under
the burdens of “policy lending.”6 Thus, the ﬁnancial system had to be built
around a relatively small number of South Korean banks, and corporate ﬁ-
nance had to be largely limited through regulatory ﬁat and tax provisions
to borrowing from those intermediaries.
Alternative sources of corporate ﬁnance were suppressed: the develop-
ment of money markets and bond markets was retarded and restricted to a
limited range of maturities with no real secondary markets, and issuance
was eﬀectively dependent on bank guarantees. The government discour-
aged the development of an eﬃcient auction and secondary market for
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6. In the characterization of one South Korean economist, “Dominance of the Korean ﬁ-
nancial market by foreign institutions was abhorred, as it would deprive authority over vari-
ous instruments of monetary control, weaken many customary, informal practices associated
with industrial policy, and might also alter the public-good nature of the ﬁnancial system”
(C.-P. Lee 1993, p. 7).government bonds, and no swap, bond, or interest futures markets existed.
As for the stock market, in 1990 the government established a quarterly
quota on new issues, and prior to the 1997 crisis a backlog of more than 360
companies was waiting to be listed (relative to the 776 that were already on
the exchange). Criminal proceedings documented that ﬁrms were forced to
resort to bribing oﬃcials to bring their initial public oﬀerings to the mar-
ket.7 As a result of these policies, corporate capital sourced through bank
loans exceeded equity, bonds, and commercial paper combined until the
late 1980s, and indirect ﬁnance from all sources was the primary form of
corporate ﬁnance until 1991 (Y. Cho 2002, table 4).
There were multiple implications of these policies. First, the ﬁrms em-
phasized growth, not proﬁtability, since risk was socialized and increased
borrowing made further borrowing advantageous under the “too big to
fail” notion, promoted by the government’s habitual interventions. From
the standpoint of a lender, the bigger the ﬁrm, the more creditworthy the
ﬁrm, since size increased the likelihood that the government would inter-
vene in the event that the ﬁrm got into ﬁnancial trouble, which it did on a
fairly routine basis. The implication was that ﬁrms became extraordinarily
leveraged as growth became the name of the game.8 Loans were the mech-
anism for growth, and, paradoxically, debt signaled creditworthiness, a
state of aﬀairs that S.-M. Yoo (1999) described as the “survival of the fat-
test.” Indeed, one study of corporate ﬁnance covering the decade 1977–86
found that “the largest ﬁrms have the weakest ﬁnancial structure,” as mea-
sured by the degree of equity in their capital structures (E. Kim 1990,
p. 342), while another found that the major chaebolwere systematically less
proﬁtable than other South Korean ﬁrms (Krueger and Yoo 2002). A
corollary to this system of corporate ﬁnancing was the encouragement of
extensive cross-shareholding, cross-loan guarantees, and nontranspar-
ency, all of which served to facilitate borrowing and had the eﬀect of dis-
advantaging outside shareholders.
10.1.2 Capital Controls
Comprehensive capital controls were used to insulate the domestic ﬁ-
nancial market from the global market.9 Inward remittances were moni-
tored to impede unauthorized foreign exchange transactions and inward
investments. Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) was discouraged by
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7. In June 1996, the governor of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a di-
rector of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MFE) were arrested for taking bribes to get
ﬁrms listed. Six other SEC executives were forced to resign.
8. In July 1997, just prior to the crisis, the average debt-equity ratio of the thirty largest
chaebol exceeded 400 percent (S.-M. Yoo 1999, table 9). By the end of 1997, it stood at 500
percent, and 600 percent of the debt of subsidiaries was included on a consolidated basis
(Claessens, Ghosh, and Scott 1999). See also Krueger and Yoo (2002, table 6).
9. See Linder (1994) and S. Kim, Kim, and Wang (2001) for descriptions. The appendix
contains a detailed chronology of the policies applied.permitting entry only into a limited range of sectors, imposing minority
ownership requirements, requiring technology transfer (in the absence of
any intellectual property rights enforcement), and imposing strict export
requirements. And while there were modest relaxations beginning in the
late 1970s, actual FDI inﬂows remained minuscule until a wide-ranging
liberalization was undertaken in response to the 1997 crisis (ﬁgure 10.4).
On the eve of the crisis, South Korea and India were the only countries in
Asia where the dominant modality of U.S. foreign investment was minority-
stake joint ventures, as opposed to majority-stake joint ventures or wholly
owned subsidiaries.
Stock market investment by nonresidents was prohibited until 1992, and
then it was subject to stringent quantitative ceilings.10 At the time of the
1997 crisis, foreign ownership of listed companies was limited to 20 percent
of capital, with individual stakes limited to 5 percent. Investment by non-
residents in domestic bonds was prohibited until 1996, and then it was sub-
ject to quantitative limitations. The local presence and activity of foreign
ﬁnancial institutions were highly circumscribed.
For much of this period outbound investment was similarly restricted.
Domestic residents were not permitted to open foreign bank accounts or
purchase foreign securities, nor were foreign entities permitted to issue
won-denominated securities domestically. Export earning had to be repa-
triated within six months. Outward direct investment required oﬃcial ap-
proval and was subject to regulations that had the eﬀect of encouraging the
intermediation of South Korean banks.11
The local currency, the won, was nonconvertible, and the South Korean
government discouraged the development of any oﬀshore market in won
or won-denominated instruments. A rapid real appreciation of the Japan-
ese yen beginning in 1985 encouraged a process of relocation of manufac-
turing activities from Japan to South Korea. The Bank of Korea accom-
modated the capital inﬂow, and between 1985 and 1989 the money supply
increased by 105 percent, the price level rose by 3 percent, and the stock
market increased by 458 percent, becoming the world’s ninth largest in
terms of capitalization.
In February 1980, following a 20 percent devaluation the previous
month, South Korea moved oﬀ a strict dollar peg and began pegging the
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10. Initially this was set at 10 percent in January 1992; it was raised to 12 percent in De-
cember 1994, 15 percent in July 1995, and 18 percent in April 1996. In June 1996, the gov-
ernment announced a further phased opening that would increase the ceiling to 20 percent in
1996, and 3 additional percentage points annually thereafter to 29 percent by 1999, and the
government added that it might abolish the ceiling entirely in 2000 if “economic circum-
stances” were appropriate.
11. For example, there were restrictions on ﬁrms’ ability to issue securities abroad and on
contracting foreign loans at rates more than 100 basis points above the London interbank
oﬀered rate (LIBOR).won to a basket of currencies that constituted the Special Drawing Right
(whose respective weights in the basket were undisclosed) plus a “policy
adjustment” factor. In the words of Jeﬀrey A. Frankel (1993), this was a
basket peg “in name only.” As observed by Balassa and Williamson (1990),
the policy adjustment factor predominated: between 1984 and 1987 the
won depreciated against all ﬁve currencies in the basket, generating an un-
dervalued currency (I.-J. Kim 1993). The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was astute enough to classify South Korea’s exchange rate regime as
a managed ﬂoat rather than a basket peg.
The undervalued won, the relocation of productive activities from Japan
to South Korea, and expansionary macroeconomic policies in the United
States, generated a growing bilateral surplus with the United States
(Noland 1993). Through the experience of the yen-dollar talks, the U.S. po-
litical system had become enamored with negotiating with other countries
over exchange rate and ﬁnancial market policies. The United States ini-
tially sought to use the IMF’s special consultative mechanism to pressure
South Korea over its exchange rate policy despite the fact that as late as
1985 the IMF had been advising further depreciation of the won. Starting
in 1986 the U.S. Treasury began publicly to pressure South Korea to
revalue the won. Although Japan was the primary focus of the ﬁnancial
provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the
“Trade Act”), South Korea emerged as a secondary target.
In its ﬁrst three congressionally mandated reports under Section 3004 of
the Trade Act, the Treasury identiﬁed South Korea as an “exchange rate
manipulator,” removing South Korea from the list in April 1990, after a
new exchange rate management system called the market average exchange
rate system was introduced. Under this arrangement, the mid-band won-
dollar rate was calculated as an average of the previous day’s transactions
and then allowed to ﬂoat within oﬃcially prescribed margins around this
rate. In 1991 the government began a process of very gradually widening
the bands, with the putative expectation that as the bands were widened a
freely ﬂoating exchange rate would emerge (B. Kim 1993). Needless to say,
things did not work out this way.
The pervasive pattern of government intervention created a symbiotic re-
lationship between the government and the private sector, eroding private-
sector autonomy and facilitating the corruption of the political system. The
move toward more genuine political competition in the late 1980s arguably
shifted the balance of power away from the government and toward the
private sector, which became the source of badly needed campaign funds
(Kang 2002a, 2002b). In the words of one contemporary observer, corrup-
tion “exploded” (Cliﬀord 1997). With the exception of current president
Roh Moo-Hyun, every South Korean president since Park Chung-Hee and/
or at least one of his sons has been imprisoned on corruption oﬀenses.
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Over time, pressure for liberalization developed both from domestic
ﬁrms disadvantaged in international competition by relatively high do-
mestic interest rates and limited options for corporate ﬁnance, and from
the U.S. government, promoting the interests of American ﬁnancial service
providers (ﬁgure 10.6).12 The outcome of this tension was a political com-
promise that resulted in a gradual, uneven, and ultimately problematic lib-
eralization program that both contributed to and was overtaken by the
1997 ﬁnancial crisis. (A chronology of policies actually applied is provided
in the appendix.)
The United States had begun pressuring South Korea for improved
market access for U.S. ﬁnancial services providers in the late 1980s, initiat-
ing a more or less ongoing process of bilateral consultations on the issue of
ﬁnancial market liberalization. The conclusion of the Sixth Five-Year Plan
(1986–91) provided treasury oﬃcials an opening to talk to their South Ko-
rean counterparts about “the vision thing.”13 Some commentators (Park,
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Fig. 10.6 Spread between long-term government bond yields, South Korea and the
United States
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Notes: For Korea, the yield reported is on national housing bonds. For the United States, the
yield reported is on the ten-year treasury note.
12. In ﬁgure 10.6 the interest rate diﬀerential is calculated as the diﬀerence between yields
on South Korean won-denominated ten-year government bonds and U.S. government bonds
of the same maturity. If one expected the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect to hold and the won to ap-
preciate in real terms over the long run, then, from the standpoint of a South Korean ﬁrm, the
implicit diﬀerential was even larger.
13. Wang Yen-Kyun (1993, p. 186) quotes the November 1991 treasury report to Congress
mandated under Section 3004 of the Trade Act as reading in part, “Most troubling at this
stage is that the Korean government appears to lack a ‘vision’ and well-deﬁned strategy for
the liberalization of its ﬁnancial markets. [Recent reforms] are steps in the right direction but
do not appear to go fast enough.”Song, and Wang 2003) argue that these discussions formed the basis of the
ﬁrst of a series of multiyear ﬁnancial sector policy plans, the most impor-
tant of which was promulgated in 1995 and scheduled to run through 1999
(Kwon 1996).14 Additional reforms were announced as part of South Ko-
rea’s 1996 accession to the OECD, which itself was undertaken for largely
politically symbolic reasons by President Kim Young-Sam. Nevertheless,
there was considerable domestic opposition to these initiatives (from un-
derwriters of domestic securities, for example), and the 1995 plan and
South Korea’s application to join the OECD became the focal points in the
internal battle over reform (as well as an opportunity for further U.S. gov-
ernment pressure).
The aspects of the plan itself were arguably captured by special interests
through corruption. Part of the process of unifying the ﬁnancial markets
had been the regularization of curb market lenders as investment and
ﬁnance companies. The traditional commercial banks began to get
squeezed: their share of deposits and lending fell steadily from roughly 80
percent in 1975 to less than 50 percent in 1990. This process accelerated in
the mid-1990s when a new class of institutions was established: merchant
banks, which had a broader remit than the existing nonbank ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. Merchant bank licenses were issued in two tranches in 1994
and 1996. The issuance of licenses was dominated by bribery and kick-
backs, and a later investigation by the Board of Audit and Inspection de-
termined that three of the ﬁfteen merchant banks approved in 1996 were
insolvent when the licenses were issued (Haggard 2000). The merchant
banks played a signiﬁcant role in the subsequent crisis both at home and
abroad through connected lending to their chaebolowners, particularly the
ﬁnancing of unviable investments in steel, automobiles, and chemicals dur-
ing the mid-1990s investment boom, and reckless investments in Russia
and Southeast Asia (Ishii and Habermeier 2002, p. 69). The commercial
banks were experiencing erosion of both market share and margins: in
1996 their share of deposits and lending had fallen to 33 percent and 43
percent, respectively, and returns on assets and equity were declining as
well.
Out of the OECD application process came a phased multiyear ﬁnan-
cial liberalization plan to break down some barriers within the domestic
market and liberalize capital outﬂows before capital inﬂows. The plan
amounted to a continuation of the ongoing liberalization process on a va-
riety of fronts, though many of its provisions would leave the government
with signiﬁcant discretion. It was unclear what controls would remain in
1999, the terminal year of the plan. At the end of 1995, domestic market in-
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14. American demands for ﬁnancial market opening are a hardy perennial. Invariant to
partisan control of the government, they continue to this day. See Frankel (1989, 1993), Wang
Yen-Kyun (1993), Blustein (2003), Stiglitz (2003), and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR;
2004) for examples.terest rates had largely been freed (indeed, a year ahead of schedule). How-
ever, the government still regulated the portfolios of commercial banks. It
still owned a large number of ﬁnancial institutions (of which the Korea De-
velopment Bank was the largest), and state-owned ﬁnancial institutions
dominated some markets (such as mortgage lending). It announced in Au-
gust 1996 that foreign investors would be allowed to invest in convertible
bonds issued by large corporations beginning in 1998, but that full open-
ing of the bond market would be delayed until the diﬀerential between Ko-
rean and overseas interest rates (at the time 500–600 basis points) nar-
rowed to 200 basis points.15 Of course there was no guarantee that this
condition would ever be met.
Government control over the introduction of new instruments had re-
tarded the adoption of innovations in the securities market, and would be
expected to continue to do so under this plan. Despite the decline of policy
loans, the central bank would still act as a source of subsidized lending to
preferred borrowers. Foreign participation in South Korean ﬁnancial mar-
kets would continue to be circumscribed, and access by residents to inter-
national capital markets would still be restricted. Under this plan, the
South Korean ﬁnancial system would have remained among the most re-
pressed in Asia. Reservations to OECD codes are permitted, and the aver-
age acceptance rate of ﬁnancial liberalization codes in the ﬁnancial ser-
vices area is 89 percent; South Korea used its exceptions remit liberally,
accepting only 65 percent of the OECD’s ﬁnancial system codes (although,
in fairness, some of these exceptions were scheduled for phaseout by 2000;
Dobson and Jacquet 1998). The Presidential Commission for Financial
Reform was established in January 1997 to propose broad follow-on rec-
ommendations for the modernization of the ﬁnancial system (Cargill
1999). Needless to say, its recommendations were overtaken by events.
The case for international ﬁnancial market integration is well known:
the beneﬁts include enhanced opportunities for intertemporal consump-
tion, greater opportunities for portfolio diversiﬁcation and risk reduction
for both borrowers and lenders, enhanced competition and technology
transfer in both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial sectors, and a reduction in sys-
temic risk. Conversely, the symptoms of ﬁnancial repression include low
rates of return to savers, banking-sector ineﬃciency manifested by high
spreads between lending and deposit rates, poor allocation of funds across
alternative uses, politicization of lending decisions, and the existence of
large informal and unregulated credit markets (“the curb market”). Finan-
cial repression tends to retard the development of the economy by dis-
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15. The chaebol had been lobbying to be allowed to access foreign capital directly through
the bond market. The government had been reluctant to do so, fearing that this would further
advantage the chaebolrelative to smaller ﬁrms that would be less able to take advantage of this
opportunity. The banks presumably also preferred to their privileged position as ﬁnancial in-
termediaries.couraging the accumulation of capital. Savers are oﬀered low rates of re-
turn, while ﬁrms face a high cost of capital for their investment needs. At
the same time ﬁnancial repression impedes the eﬃcient allocation of what
capital is accumulated. Projects are typically not funded according to their
rates of return but rather on the basis of noneconomic considerations,
which may include political connections or bribery of the relevant oﬃcials.
The likely result of ﬁnancial repression is that the total amount of savings
is lower than it should be and the allocation of the total among its possible
uses is ineﬃcient. Disequilibrium in the ﬁnancial markets generates rents
that may be allocated through corruption. These distortions become severe
when the real economy develops rapidly and proﬁtable real investment op-
portunities abound yet the ﬁnancial system lags behind. Capital controls
act as an implicit tax on holders of government debt. By restricting inter-
national capital ﬂows, the government can in eﬀect force domestic resi-
dents to accept government debt at lower interest rates than would be the
case if there were no controls on capital.
These arguments are easily applicable to the South Korean case, and in-
deed supporting evidence could be observed contemporaneously. Oppor-
tunities for intertemporal consumption smoothing could be particularly
important for a country like South Korea, where the rate of return on cap-
ital during this period was quite high (ﬁgure 10.5) and the economy was
subject to major ﬁnancial shocks, such as the need to ﬁnance uniﬁcation
(Noland 1996b).16 With respect to portfolio diversiﬁcation, during the pe-
riod under consideration, foreign investment in the South Korean stock
market was legally restricted, and in statistical terms it was “mildly seg-
mented” from the rest of the world (Claessens and Rhee 1994; Watanabe
1996). There was even some evidence that the correlation between move-
ments in the South Korean and foreign markets was declining, which
would have enhanced the attractiveness of cross-border diversiﬁcation. Al-
though it was sometimes argued that foreign investment in the stock mar-
ket amounted to “hot money,” the dominant behavior of foreign investors
was to reinvest sales as part of the process of portfolio realignment (Jun
1995). Giovanni and deMelo (1993) estimate that in the case of South Ko-
rea for the period 1975–87, the “ﬁnancial repression tax”—the reduction
in borrowing costs to the central government generated by capital controls
that eﬀectively force domestic residents to invest in local instruments or the
implicit tax rate—was more than 5 percent, amounting to 0.25 percent of
national income, or 1–2 percent of actual tax revenues.
Not only were the prospective gains to relaxation capital controls dis-
cernable, but the implicit costs were also evident. There were enormous
spreads across borrowers, reﬂecting the segmentation and repression of ﬁ-
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16. See Y. Cho (2002, ﬁg. 1) and Krueger and Yoo (2002, tables 3–4, ﬁgs. 1–2) for alterna-
tive estimates of rates of return.nancial markets (ﬁgure 10.5). The South Korean ﬁnancial service sector
was bureaucratized, bloated, and backward. This was reﬂected in the low
average rate of return on bank assets, which was among the lowest of those
observed in emerging markets (Goldstein and Turner 1996, table 5). The
role of foreign ﬁrms was highly circumscribed. Given the highly concen-
trated South Korean industrial structure with respect to both ﬁrms (a rel-
atively small number of ﬁrms accounted for a large share of national in-
come) and the composition of output and exports (highly concentrated in
a few products such as automobiles and computer chips), systemic risk
was a real concern. The situation was exacerbated by a relaxation in 1995
of bank provisioning requirements and by fragmented regulatory author-
ity, in which the Bank of Korea was responsible for oversight of the com-
mercial banks while “poor supervision [of the merchant banks] by the
MOFE [Ministry of Finance and Economy] created the possibility for reg-
ulatory arbitrage and high risk practices” (Ishii and Habermeier 2002,
p. 69).17 Macroeconomic volatility was higher than in other Asian econ-
omies, and data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) indi-
cated that the risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratio of South Korean banks
was among the lowest of all developing countries (Goldstein and Turner
1996).
South Korean reluctance to deregulate reﬂected a mixture of motiva-
tions. There were two sorts of counterarguments oﬀered in opposition to
liberalization. The ﬁrst was that the South Korean ﬁnancial service ﬁrms
simply could not compete. Some South Koreans probably opposed liber-
alization out of self-interest, since liberalization would erode their privi-
leged position within the South Korean ﬁnancial system. (Likewise, some
foreign calls for opening the Korean ﬁnancial market were surely moti-
vated by similar self-interest.) For example, Park Yung-Chul (1995, p. 7) ar-
gued that “domestic ﬁnancial institutions have little competitive advan-
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17. Writing prior to the crisis, the present author summarized the situation as follows:
The potential problem with the system is the implicit guarantee that banks not be allowed
to fail; this, together with deposit insurance, simultaneously creates an incentive for banks
to seek risk, while it relieves depositors of the incentive to monitor bank health....  M o r e -
over, the Korean deﬁnition of bad loans is narrower than that commonly used abroad, and
foreign bankers estimate the true bad loan problem may be three times as large as admit-
t e d ....   Concerns about the banking system are further aggravated by the MFE’s dual
function as a promoter and supervisor of ﬁnancial institutions, and legitimate questions
can be raised about the degree of independence of the regulatory authorities....  T h e  bot-
tom line is that Korea should be concerned about the strength of its banking system, and
much of this concern is related to domestic ﬁnancial repression and is unrelated to the issue
of external ﬁnancial liberalization. Market discipline does not work when there is a lack of
information, or when the notion that banks cannot fail is widely held. The appropriate re-
sponses are to deal with the structural problems of the banking system (which are likely to
involve both domestic and international liberalization together with strengthened pru-
dential supervision by public authorities), to strengthen public disclosure requirements,
and to signal limits on public bailouts. (Noland 1996a, pp. 12–14; emphasis in the orig-
inal)tage over their foreign counterparts. At best Korea’s ﬁnancial sector re-
mains an infant industry and may need market protection.”18On some level
this was undoubtedly true (although irrelevant): the South Korean bank-
ing sector was highly ineﬃcient, as could easily be observed at the time.
This was subsequently conﬁrmed by the industry’s postcrisis consolida-
tion, which, despite a strong union presence in the industry, was accompa-
nied by a roughly 40 percent decline in sectoral employment and no ap-
parent diminution in service.
A more serious argument was that destabilizing capital ﬂows would cre-
ate macroeconomic instability. Park and Song (1996, p. 14) wrote, “Korean
policymakers have been reluctant to liberalize the capital account rapidly.
There is concern that devastating macroeconomic instability would result
from a sudden opening of ﬁnancial markets. In contrast eﬃciency gains to
the economy from liberalization are considered to be small, possibly even
insigniﬁcant, and at best realized in the long run.” Johnston et al. (1999,
p. 71) write that upon joining the OECD, South Korean government oﬃ-
cials expressed their disinclination to ease capital controls further and
explicitly stressed that they wished to maintain controls over short-term
capital inﬂows that may “hamper macroeconomic and ﬁnancial market
stability.” A major source of reluctance to remove barriers to capital in-
ﬂows was the fear that inﬂows of reserves would increase the money supply
excessively and lead to real exchange rate appreciation, either through in-
ﬂation or through nominal appreciation of the currency.19
A striking aspect of the South Korean case is that while a variety of pol-
icy responses to this concern were suggested, it does not appear that any
were seriously considered. One way of avoiding excessive appreciation
would have been to continue to sterilize the capital inﬂows, as South Ko-
rean policymakers had done throughout the 1980s and 1990s by forcing
domestic ﬁnancial institutions to purchase monetary stabilization bonds
(MSBs) to oﬀset the expansionary impact on the money supply of foreign
capital inﬂows. Indeed, research cited by Park Yung-Chul (1995) indicated
that the optimal policy from a South Korean standpoint would have been
a mixture of exchange rate adjustment and sterilization. Sterilization may
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18. Another South Korean economist wrote, “Unless the weakness in domestic ﬁnancial
institutions is improved, ﬁnancial markets in Korea could eventually be controlled by foreign
ﬁrms. Fortunately, [under the agreement with the OECD] it is predicted that liberalization of
capital movements will not result in foreign control of domestic ﬁnancial industries. Such pre-
diction is supported by the fact that foreign banks operating in Korea have experienced a de-
cline in their asset size, and foreign insurance ﬁrms’ market share is less than one percent”
(Chae 1997, pp. 71–2).
19. For example, in an NBER paper, D. Cho and Koh (1996) write, “With the current level
of interest rate diﬀerentials between Korea and developed economies, drastic full-scale liber-
alization would certainly induce a large amount of capital inﬂows and appreciate the Korean
won. This would aﬀect the price competitiveness of Korean products in international mar-
kets, which could bring about signiﬁcant macro-instability in an economy like Korea which
relies heavily upon external transactions” (p. 1).have been advisable in the short run, but it is doubtful whether this is a
good long-term policy: such a policy generates quasi-ﬁscal costs as long as
the interest rate on the MSBs exceeds the return on holding foreign ex-
change. (In the case of comparable Latin American countries, Leiderman
[1995] estimated their annual costs at 0.25 percent to 0.50 percent of na-
tional income.) In any event, since domestic rates were higher than foreign
rates, it would be desirable to reduce domestic rates and obtain the bene-
ﬁts of higher investment and growth.20 Moreover, as domestic ﬁnancial
markets became more complex, the ability of the Bank of Korea to exercise
monetary control through administrative guidance and MSBs would be
increasingly less possible, underscoring the advisability of developing the
capacity for indirect control through open market operations. Another al-
ternative, proposed by Dornbusch and Park (1995), was for the govern-
ment to create a long-term (six years or more) won currency bond exclu-
sively for foreigners for use when sterilizing capital inﬂows.
If it is not possible to adequately sterilize or otherwise oﬀset inﬂows, and
the capital inﬂows are ﬁnancing consumption (instead of investment), an-
other response would be to reintroduce some controls on capital inﬂows,
presumably in the form of “Tobin taxes” that would throw some sand in the
external ﬁnancial market wheels.21Park Yung-Chul and colleagues (Dorn-
busch and Park 1995; Park 1995; Park and Song 1996) devoted consider-
able eﬀort to thinking about this in the South Korean context. They raised
two possibilities, which they appeared to regard as temporary measures for
extreme situations. The ﬁrst was a variable deposit requirement (VDR), in
which reserve or deposit requirements are imposed on capital inﬂows, with
the deposit varying according to type of inﬂow and investor. It is possible,
in principle, that the reserve requirement could be set exactly so that the
opportunity cost of the deposit sitting in a non-interest-bearing Bank of
Korea account could exactly oﬀset the international interest rate diﬀeren-
tial. Apparently the legal framework existed for the imposition of this de-
posit requirement, and the existing procedures would make it feasible to
impose this on foreigners. The main problem (beyond damage to future
credibility with foreign investors) would appear to be that this would also
most certainly generate conﬂicts with foreign governments and investors
and, depending on its implementation, possibly amount to a violation of
South Korea’s World Trade Organization commitments. These emergency
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20. Park (1995) suggested central bank swaps as a possible alternative to sterilization.
When central bank foreign exchange holdings got too high, the central bank would sell for-
eign exchange to domestic ﬁnancial institutions to invest abroad. At the end of a speciﬁed
time, the swap would be reversed, and the central bank would compensate ﬁnancial institu-
tions for losses due to interest rate diﬀerentials and exchange rate movements. The problem,
as in the case of sterilization, is that the quasi-ﬁscal cost could be high.
21. If the foreign capital inﬂows were going into productivity-enhancing investment, the
proper response would be to allow the exchange rate to appreciate with productivity gains and
allow the capital inﬂows to continue.safeguards were to be explicitly authorized postcrisis in the Foreign Ex-
change Transaction Act of 1999.
The alternative to controlling quantity (in terms of setting the size of the
deposit) would be to control price, and Park and Song (1996) raised the is-
sue of a transaction tax, for which, like the VDR, the necessary legal frame-
work apparently already existed. The transaction tax could be conﬁned to
capital account transactions and, in principle, could be imposed solely on
foreigners. Like the VDR, this would surely raise hackles with foreign ﬁrms
and governments. Moreover, although the won could not legally trade out-
side of South Korea, it is hard to see why interested parties could not
simply move their activities oﬀshore and avoid the tax. More generally, the
market for the won was already relatively thin, and it is not clear that re-
ducing the volume of transactions would be desirable.
Finally, one might ﬁght destabilizing inﬂows by encouraging outﬂows.
At ﬁrst blush, encouraging outﬂows to oﬀset inﬂows would appear to be
the natural response to concerns about excessive net inﬂows. There are two
arguments as to why encouraging outﬂows may actually exacerbate the
problem, however. First, barriers to outﬂows create an element of irre-
versibility to foreign investors, and if there is uncertainty about the future
conduct of economic policy, then this irreversibility may deter investment.
Elimination of irreversibility through the removal of capital controls could
reduce foreign investor caution and paradoxically lead to higher net in-
ﬂows. Second, since barriers to external ﬂows are sometimes maintained to
facilitate the collection of ﬁnancial repression taxes, the removal of the im-
pediments may be regarded as a signal of a lower permanent rate of taxa-
tion on capital, and thus it can induce capital inﬂow. It is unclear whether
either of these arguments carried much force in the South Korean case.
In any event, South Korean authorities appeared to be proceeding more
rapidly with liberalization on outbound ﬂows than on inbound ﬂows. To the
extent that one believes that, for conventional portfolio diversiﬁcation rea-
sons, domestic residents wish to hold foreign currency assets and have been
prevented from doing so, the elimination of these impediments would en-
courage capital outﬂow. If the fundamental concern about external ﬁnan-
cial liberalization is that it would lead to destabilizing net inﬂows, the South
Korean policy amounted to ﬁring the guns before the enemy was in sight.
Not only that, but the eﬀect of government policy was to encourage
those inﬂows to take the form of short-term lending to South Korean
banks. The closure to foreign investors of the long-term corporate bond
market created the perverse incentive to raise capital through short-term
borrowing. This was signiﬁcant because South Korean ﬁrms were highly
concentrated in relatively footloose manufacturing industries and subject
to contentious labor relations at home. As a consequence, South Korean
ﬁrms began investing abroad at a scale that was unusually large for an
economy at its level of income and industrial development.
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rency borrowing by allowing ﬁrms to borrow abroad directly or through
South Korean banks to ﬁnance the importation of capital goods (ﬁgure
10.7). With interest rates relatively high in South Korea, and continued re-
strictions on ﬁrms’ ability to issue long-term bonds or secure long-term
loans in foreign markets still in eﬀect, ﬁrms were encouraged to increase
their reliance on short-term foreign borrowing, and South Korean banks
were encouraged to step up their on-lending activities (ﬁgure 10.8).22
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Fig. 10.7 Foreign currency percentage share of total debt, 1994–2002
Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004), table 4.4.
Fig. 10.8 Borrowing by domestic banks from international banks and net foreign
currency assets
Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004), tables 2.2 and 4.3.
22. Further impetus was provided in October 1995 when the government announced that,
in the case of direct investments abroad by South Korean corporations of $100 million or
more, at least one-ﬁfth of the funds would have to be raised at home.The following year, the government removed restrictions on banks’ for-
eign currency loans, resulting in a massive increase in net foreign currency
liabilities (ﬁgure 10.8). Moreover, the Bank of Korea applied window guid-
ance to limit medium- and long-term borrowing on international markets,
apparently due to concerns about potential loss of control over domestic
ﬁnancial institutions through debt-equity swaps biasing borrowing toward
the short end of the term spectrum (Johnston et al. 1999). Short-term ex-
ternal debt rose from $40 billion in U.S. dollars in 1993 to US$98 billion at
the end of September 1997, representing more than half of external liabil-
ities and more than three times the amount of foreign exchange reserves
(ﬁgure 10.9). The growth of short-term debt outstripped the growth in us-
able reserves, raising the specter of a liquidity crunch. The ratio of usable
international reserves—oﬃcial reserves less the amount of illiquid funds
that had been deposited at overseas bank branches to cover short-term
debt repayments—to short-term debt declined from 42 percent in 1993 to
29 percent at year-end 1996 (Chopra et al. 2002).
These demand-side factors were reinforced by supply-side eﬀects
through the Basel Accords. Lending to other OECD banks, irrespective of
the term of the loan, is assigned a risk weight of 20 percent in the capital
adequacy requirements. However, in the case of non-OECD banks, the as-
sessments vary with the term of the loan: loans of less than one year’s du-
ration receive the 20 percent risk weight while those with a duration of
more than one year are assigned a 100 percent risk rate. Since all corporate
lending receives the 100 percent risk weight, Basel Accord incentives ar-
guably encouraged lending to South Korea to take the form of short-term
bank lending, reinforcing South Korean government policy (Johnston et
al. 1999). When South Korea joined the OECD, the eﬀect was to reduce the
risk premium on lending to South Korea.
The net result was currency and term mismatching on a massive scale.
One way of getting a handle on the implications of this is suggested by
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Fig. 10.9 Short-term external debt as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves
Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004), table 9.1.Goldstein and Turner (2004), who propose an aggregate eﬀective currency
mismatch measure—the net foreign currency asset position normalized by
a country’s export openness and the foreign currency share of total debt—
as a shorthand stress indicator of the vulnerability of an economy to an ex-
change rate depreciation. As shown in ﬁgure 10.10, South Korea moved
from a small net negative position in 1994 (i.e., an exchange rate deprecia-
tion would slightly reduce the net worth of the economy) to a sizable neg-
ative position in 1996, as the economy experienced a tenfold rise in net cur-
rency liabilities and a smaller increase in the foreign currency share of total
debt, in the absence of a signiﬁcant increase in export openness. The im-
plication of this movement in the Goldstein-Turner measure was that,
heading into 1997, a South Korean currency collapse was both more likely
to occur and more likely to have a severe impact on the economy.23 Al-
though internal vulnerabilities could be easily observed contemporane-
ously, few if any analysts properly understood the external vulnerabilities
created by the borrowing activities of overseas bank aﬃliates.
10.3 The 1997 Crisis and Its Aftermath
Between 1994 and 1996 South Korea experienced an investment boom
that was increasingly ﬁnanced by mismatched foreign borrowing. Unlike
Southeast Asia, where the investment boom was concentrated in the real
estate sector, much of the capital was ﬂowing into manufacturing, pre-
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Fig. 10.10 Modiﬁed Goldstein-Turner aggregate eﬀective currency mismatch
(AECM) estimates, 1994–2002
Source: Goldstein and Turner (2004), table 4.6.
23. To be clear the eﬀective mismatch index is retrospective—the data requirements pre-
clude contemporaneous calculation of the measure. However, the index is now reported on
the Asian Development Bank’s AsianBondsOnline Web site, http://asianbondsonline.adb
.org/asianbondindicators/ave_eﬀect_currmsmatch.php.sumptively giving less cause for concern.24 However, a substantial share
was invested in industries that were already arguably characterized by ex-
cess capacity, and by the mid-1990s South Korea was experiencing slowing
total factor productivity growth, deteriorating terms of trade, and declin-
ing proﬁtability. South Korea’s largest export market, Japan, went into re-
cession in 1996, and the yen began to depreciate signiﬁcantly against the
dollar, generating an eﬀective real appreciation of the won. Export growth
slowed in 1996 and turned negative the following year. Stock market prices,
which peaked in 1994, accelerated their decline.
As conditions worsened in 1996, the margin of error for the highly lever-
aged chaebol evaporated. In January 1997 Hanbo Steel, the seventeenth-
largest chaebol ranked by sales, collapsed amid $6 billion of outstanding
debts. The collapse of Hanbo, the ﬁrst major chaebol to go bankrupt in
more than a decade, was to have repercussions beyond its debts: a subse-
quent series of bribery arrests culminating in the arrest and conviction of
President Kim Young-Sam’s son and political conﬁdante, Kim Hyun-
Chol, shook the political establishment and greatly damaged the elder
Kim. The Hanbo collapse was followed by the failures of two more chae-
bol, driving up interest rates in the large corporate bond market and im-
posing negative externalities on all corporate borrowers. During the sec-
ond quarter of 1997, spreads on South Korean government bonds began
to widen, while, as points of comparison, those on Indonesian and Ma-
laysian government bonds remained unchanged. The market was signal-
ing an increase in South Korean country risk. The turning point arguably
came in June with the failed nationalization of Kia, the country’s third-
largest automaker.
Despite these worsening conditions, the vulnerability of the South Ko-
rean economy was not universally appreciated, by either forecasters,
whose expectations for the South Korean economy were myopic in the ex-
treme (ﬁgure 10.11), South Korean government oﬃcials, or the IMF.25
If domestic turmoil had been its only problem, South Korea might have
been able to avoid the conﬂagration that was to engulf it. Instead, in the
second half of 1997 South Korea was rocked by the shocks emanating from
the ﬁnancial crisis that had seized Southeast Asia and an emerging bank-
South Korea’s Experience with International Capital Flows 503
24. There is a gargantuan literature on the South Korean crisis of 1997–98. For entry points
into this literature, see Wang Yunjong and Zang (1998), Noland (2000), Smith (2000), Coe
and Kim (2002), and Web sites maintained by the NBER, http://www.nber.org/~confer/2000/
korea00/korea00.html, and Nouriel Roubini, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/.
25. For example, the head of one government think tank, after accurately diagnosing the
labor problems, loss of political conﬁdence, and macroeconomic imbalances emerging in
South Korea, in a public address in Washington, DC, in April 1997, dismissed concerns over
the short-term debt and concluded: “There is, in fact, no economic crisis in Korea, if, by a cri-
sis, we mean that there is imminent danger to the national economy—as was the case with
Mexico in 1994” (Young 1997, p. 4). He was not alone—as late as September 1997, IMF mis-
sions to Seoul were giving the economy a clean bill of health.ing crisis in Japan, its principal source of foreign loans. The South Korean
economy was adversely aﬀected through three channels: spillovers in real
terms as the depreciations of its competitors (especially Taiwan) eﬀectively
acted as competitive devaluations; contagion in ﬁnancial terms; and a pre-
cipitous decline in rollover rates as Japanese banks hunkered down. The re-
sult was a collapse in private capital inﬂows (ﬁgure 10.4).
These forces put considerable downward pressure on the won in the lat-
ter part of 1997. South Korean authorities spent billions of dollars in an
unsuccessful attempt to maintain their quasi-peg, but by December they
were forced to abandon any pretense of controlling the exchange rate.26
The currency went into a free fall. Developments in the currency market re-
bounded on the domestic ﬁnancial system. As the exchange rate collapsed,
ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms with unhedged foreign currency–denom-
inated debt were crushed by a mounting debt burden in domestic resource
cost terms. By the year’s end the stock market had lost more than half its
value in a period of eight months.
South Korea initially sought assistance from Japan and the United
States bilaterally; after being rebuﬀed, it approached the IMF. The IMF,
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Fig. 10.11 Real GDP growth forecast and expected real exchange rate change
Source: Noland (2000), ﬁgure 6.5.
26. On 27 August a high-ranking oﬃcial of the MFE, in one of history’s weirder abuses of
metaphor, told a Seoul press conference that the Bank of Korea would defend its “Maginot
Line” of 900 won to the dollar. Unfortunately, this new Maginot Line was as ineﬀective as the
original, and the level was soon breached. The Bank of Korea continued to intervene in the
foreign exchange market in a futile attempt to defend the won. On November 17, in a press
conference that would have been farcical if not for the stakes, MFE oﬃcials again invoked the
Maginot Line imagery, solemnly declaring that they would defend their newest line of 1,000
won to the dollar. They spent billions of dollars trying, but the following day the barrier was
breached once again.the multilateral development banks, and bilateral donors agreed to con-
tribute to a rescue. Agreement was reached in November on a US$57 bil-
lion package—then the largest in history, and nearly twenty times South
Korea’s IMF quota—in return for broad, though vaguely worded, re-
forms. This agreement was promptly denounced by all three candidates in
the ongoing presidential campaign. The National Assembly refused to
consider a package of ﬁnancial reform legislation proposed by MFE, and
the bank regulators marched on the National Assembly to protest their
possible reorganization. Moreover, given the vagueness of the reform com-
mitments, outside observers expressed skepticism about their eventual im-
plementation. South Korean asset prices continued to plummet. On De-
cember 18 a former political dissident, Kim Dae-Jung, was elected presi-
dent. The following week, default was avoided when a second agreement
involving expedited disbursements was concluded, and William McDon-
ough, chairman of the New York Federal Reserve, persuaded the inter-
national banks to keep their credit lines open. Ultimately, South Korea’s
creditors were persuaded to exchange their existing short-term loans for
government-guaranteed bonds of longer maturity.27
In negotiating the second package, the IMF extracted signiﬁcant policy
commitments, including both monetary and ﬁscal tightening (despite the
fact that the 1996 general government budget surplus was 5 percent of
GDP), as well as a variety of structural reforms, some unrelated to the ﬁ-
nancial crisis, such as the removal of the ban on the importation of Japan-
ese automobiles. Although trade liberalization had been a staple of other
IMF programs, the inclusion of these items contributed to the perception
in South Korea that the IMF was simply being used as a tool of Japanese,
and especially U.S. commercial policy.
Feldstein (1998) argues that the South Korean case could be thought of
as a fundamentally well-functioning economy experiencing a temporary
liquidity crisis. Had the IMF initially acted to coordinate a restructuring of
private-sector lending while providing temporary credits (in essence a
bridge loan), the huge oﬃcial money package could have been avoided and
along with it the intrusive conditionality that the IMF demanded as part
of the second deal. Indeed, South Korea ultimately borrowed less than $29
billion and in fact did not draw down the entire IMF portion of the loan.
The South Korean crisis presented the IMF, the major ﬁnance min-
istries, and the multilateral development banks with a diﬃcult situation. It
occurred in the context of a cascading set of crises, which threatened to
spread to Brazil and Russia. The South Korean government’s willingness
to guarantee the short-term foreign debt of private entities socialized risk,
creating moral hazard and ultimately increasing the severity of the crisis. It
waited too long to approach the IMF, and once it did, it engaged in un-
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27. See IMF (2003) for a detailed description of the coordinated rollover.helpful tactics such as leaking conﬁdential documents. The IMF and its al-
lies had little control over these events, and in November 1997 they con-
fronted a situation that arguably posed a systemic risk to the international
ﬁnancial system.
When push came to shove, the IMF and its collaborators provided South
Korea with an enormous package, far beyond its past lending practices in
other cases, and a timely infusion of cash that undoubtedly prevented a
chaotic default. That said, the macroeconomic conditionality imposed on
South Korea was too severe.28 It needlessly intensiﬁed the recession that
was to come to be known colloquially as “the IMF recession” as the
growth rate collapsed from 7 percent in 1996 to –7 percent in 1998 before
rebounding to more than 10 percent in 1999 (ﬁgure 10.1). Yet the South
Korean economy had been beset with some signiﬁcant structural prob-
lems, and, given the vast scope of the December 1997 standby agreement,
considerable demands for structural reform could be expected, at least
with regard to ﬁnancial market regulation and corporate governance.
Other aspects of the program, requiring speciﬁc trade and labor market re-
forms, or demanding an independent central bank with price stability as its
sole mandate, were intrusive and at best only tangentially connected to the
crisis.29 Yet one could argue that the existence of such a demanding inter-
national organization allowed Kim Dae-Jung to advance his own relatively
liberal economic agenda more eﬀectively than if the IMF or some similar
organization had not existed.
In a sense South Korea beneﬁted from the vagaries of the electoral cal-
endar—President Kim entered the Blue House essentially owing nothing
to the dominant interests in the society and could blame the mishap on his
predecessor. Given this freedom to maneuver, he moved resolutely to ex-
tract concessions from both the labor unions and the chaebol.In the ﬁnan-
cial sector, the government immediately closed two brokerage houses and
a number of merchant banks (including some aﬃliated with chaebol). The
government began the process of auctioning oﬀtwo nationalized commer-
cial banks, while putting other ﬁnancial institutions on short tethers. De-
spite the austerity and dislocation that would accompany the process of re-
structuring, the ﬁnancial markets responded positively to these actions.
The crisis forced a restructuring of South Korea’s systems of ﬁnance,
regulation, and corporate governance, and a dismantling of the pervasive
controls on international capital ﬂows that characterized the precrisis
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28. There is a substantial academic literature on the monetary policy aspects of the crisis
response that reaches ambiguous conclusions about the interest rate increases embodied in
the IMF program. There is less disagreement that the ﬁscal tightening was inappropriate. See
IMF (2003) for a review.
29. The IMF appears to have belatedly acquiesced on this point, observing that “the IMF
may have been better advised to conﬁne its advice and conditionality to a narrower range of
issues, and then let the Korean authorities deﬁne their own agenda for implementation on a
more focused set of policy issues” (IMF 2003, p. 111).regime. Since the crisis South Korea has arguably made better progress on
economic reform than the other heavily aﬀected Asian crisis countries, or
Japan, for that matter.
One manifestation of this has been an increase in FDI. As noted earlier,
before the crisis, South Korea was unusual in that the dominant modality
of investment was minority stake joint ventures. FDI spiked in 1999 and
2000 and has fallen considerably since then (H.-K. Kim 2004, table 1). The
temporary hike stemmed in large part from foreign minority partners buy-
ing out their South Korean counterparts—given the opacity of South Ko-
rean accounting practices at the time, incumbent investors were uniquely
informed about the franchise value of these businesses.30 Subsequent FDI
has mostly taken the form of greenﬁeld investments.
In the ﬁnancial sector, prudential regulation has been consolidated and
strengthened through the creation of the Financial Supervisory Commis-
sion and the introduction of new regulatory practices, approaches, and
standards. Competition was injected into the ﬁnancial sector by the in-
creased role of foreigners through a variety of institutional arrangements.
What appears to be more diﬃcult to change has been the lending culture
of South Korean ﬁnancial institutions (Mann 2000). In the aftermath of
the crisis, lenders went from bingeing on corporate lending to bingeing on
household lending: South Korean household debt registered the fastest
growth in the world, increasing 18 percentage points of GDP in two years,
before ending in crisis with the insolvency of the country’s largest credit
card issuer.31 A current challenge centers on the rapidly growing use of ﬁ-
nancial derivatives by South Korean ﬁnancial institutions and the concern
that the regulatory regime may not have kept pace with ﬁnancial innova-
tion.
Nevertheless, the improvement in the function of South Korea’s ﬁnan-
cial system can be seen in ﬁrm-level balance sheet data: South Korean cor-
porations on the whole have reduced their leverage, and access to capital is
increasingly a function of proﬁtability (Alexander 2003). This develop-
ment is, in turn, facilitated by improved corporate governance through en-
hanced ﬁnancial transparency, stricter enforcement of existing laws, and
expanded scope for minority shareholders to seek legal redress.
What has not happened is the development of independent institutional
investors capable of monitoring management. To the extent that such in-
stitutional investors exist in South Korea, they tend to be aﬃliated with the
major chaebol, and although some foreign institutional investors and the
nascent shareholder rights movement have exerted some salutary inﬂu-
ence, it is fair to say that the country still lacks a real market for corporate
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30. One issue is whether these acquisitions amounted to a “ﬁre sale” of assets by ﬁnancially
distressed South Korean ﬁrms. Econometric results reported by Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar
(2004) suggest not.
31. See IMF (2004) for a summary of the credit card debacle.control. South Korean equity markets have become more integrated with
markets elsewhere. In part this increase reﬂects the natural integration of
markets following the removal of restrictions on foreign ownerships of
South Korean stocks (foreigners now own more than 40 percent of the
shares on the Korean Stock Exchange) and the removal of restrictions on
South Korean residents’ ability to invest abroad. Yet despite these devel-
opments, the interest rate spread on South Korean debt remains higher
than it was precrisis (ﬁgure 10.12).
In June 1998 the government announced a plan to liberalize all foreign
exchange transactions in two stages. The ﬁrst stage took eﬀect on April 1,
1999, with the implementation of the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act,
which liberalized most existing restrictions on current account transac-
tions and established a negative list system for capital account transactions
under which transactions are legal unless stipulated by law or decree. (See
the appendix in K.-S. Kim 2001 for a complete description.) The second
stage of the exchange control liberalization took eﬀect January 1, 2002.
In April 2002 the government announced “The Plan for the Develop-
ment of the Korean Foreign Exchange Market,” which envisions full liber-
alization of foreign exchange regulations by 2011 as part of the govern-
ment’s attempt to establish South Korea as a regional business hub for
Northeast Asia. At present the exchange rate system is classiﬁed as inde-
pendently ﬂoating in an inﬂation-targeting framework by the IMF. In re-
cent years, however, exchange rate interventions have been sizable: they ap-
pear to go beyond the smoothing operations as characterized by the IMF
and instead involve an attempt to prevent appreciation of the won. As of
August 2004, South Korea had accumulated US$171 billion in oﬃcial re-
serves, and exchange rate policy and the magnitude of currency market in-
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Fig. 10.12 JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index global strip spread for
South Korea, 1994–2004
Source: JPMorgan’s MorganMarkets database.terventions have emerged as a source of controversy within the South Ko-
rean government.
10.4 Conclusion
South Korea is a fascinating case in that it combines the characteristics
of sustained prosperity, capital controls, and ﬁnancial crisis in a striking
manner. Pervasive capital controls, which delinked South Korea’s internal
ﬁnancial markets from the rest of the world, were a necessary component
of the country’s capital-channeling development strategy. This strategy
clearly was consistent with rapid and sustained economic development, al-
though it may or may not have been causal.
These interventions create domestic political constituencies for both
their perpetuation and dissolution, and the implementation of liberaliza-
tion programs will reﬂect political competition among these groups. Tran-
sition is also aﬀected by the demands of foreign ﬁnancial services pro-
viders, which, having developed greater eﬃciency in a more competitive
environment, regard the protected market as an opportunity. All of these
phenomena are evident in the South Korean case.
Because of its somewhat amorphous nature, perhaps the most diﬃcult
challenge is the legacy of ﬁnancial repression in “dumbing down” both
private-sector actors and their public-sector regulatory counterparts. The
main ongoing concern in South Korea is not the macroeconomic adjust-
ment to the removal of capital controls per se, but rather the lingering con-
cerns about both the lending culture of South Korean ﬁnancial-sector
ﬁrms and the capacity of South Korean authorities to successfully regulate
the more complex ﬁnancial system enabled by liberalization.
The obvious question is whether South Korea could have developed a
more dynamic and market-oriented ﬁnancial system in the presence of in-
ternational capital controls. In theory there is no reason why this could not
have happened if South Korea had chosen this path. Indeed, the strength-
ening of domestic ﬁnancial institutions prior to opening the capital ac-
count is a staple of the sequencing literature, and South Korea in the late
1980s appeared to meet the basic preconditions for a successful transition,
such as ﬁscal health (Edwards 1989). Similarly, one can imagine a greater
(or lesser) role for foreign ﬁnancial service providers under a variety of in-
stitutional and regulatory constructs. Yet it is doubtful whether this could
have been obtained in practice. Neither South Korean government oﬃcials
nor the intelligentsia evinced much ideological commitment to the notion
of freer ﬁnancial markets, and, perhaps more important, there were some
very large and powerful interest groups that were opposed to liberalization.
For better or worse, given the speciﬁcs of the South Korean situation, freer
international capital ﬂows, a less regulated domestic ﬁnancial system, and
an increased role for foreign ﬁnancial service providers were probably not
greatly separable components of ﬁnancial-sector reform.
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Chronology of Capital Flow Liberalization in South Korea
This appendix provides a timeline of capital ﬂow liberalization in South
Korea. It is derived primarily, though not exclusively, from Johnston et al.
(1999) and the Bank of Korea web site, http://www.bok.or.kr. The chronol-
ogy is organized by topic: FDI, portfolio investment, other capital ﬂows,
capital market organization, and foreign exchange.
Foreign Direct Investment
1983
• Revision of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law establishes the prin-
ciple that inward FDI, subject to approval, is permitted except in spe-
ciﬁc “negative list” sectors.
1985
• More than 100 sectors are eliminated from the negative list. The “lib-
eralization ratio” (share of industries open to FDI) reaches 76 per-
cent, 92 percent in manufacturing.
1986
• Initial liberalization of restrictions on direct investment abroad be-
gins.
1987
• Twenty-six additional manufacturing sectors are eliminated from the
negative list.
• Tax incentives for FDI in strategic sectors are reduced.
1988
• Restrictions on FDI in advertising, motion pictures, and insurance are
relaxed.
1989
• Six manufacturing sectors are opened to FDI, raising the liberaliza-
tion ratio to 79 percent, 98 percent in manufacturing.
• Limit on automatic approval is raised to US$5 million from US$3 mil-
lion.
1990
• The limit on automatic approval is raised to US$100 million from
US$3 million.
• Two more sectors are opened to FDI.
1991
• The approval requirement is replaced with notiﬁcation system for
projects with foreign participation of less than 50 percent.
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three years, while a 50 percent exemption is established for the two
successive years.
• Restrictions on foreign ownership of retail businesses are relaxed.
1992
• The approval requirement is replaced by a notiﬁcation system for in-
vestments in most business sectors.
1994
• The Foreign Capital Inducement Act is amended to streamline appli-
cation procedures. Rules on land ownership are relaxed.
1995
• Investment in 101 sectors is permitted or greatly liberalized.
1997
• August: The debt limits on corporations making overseas direct in-
vestments, whereby 20 percent of investments exceeding US$100 mil-
lion had to be ﬁnanced by a ﬁrm’s own capital, are abolished.
1998
• The Foreign Investment Promotion Act establishes the principle of na-
tional treatment; further narrows the negative list down to 5 percent of
all sectors and 1 percent of manufacturing (twenty-two sectors, includ-
ing real estate rentals and sales, land development, waterworks, and
investment companies and trusts, fully open to foreign investment);
broadens the scope of tax incentives available to foreign investors; sim-
pliﬁes approval procedures; and establishes foreign investment zones.
1999
• Five more categories—book publishing, alcoholic beverages, external
maritime transport, blood-related products, and casinos—are fully
opened.
• Investment in foreign real estate by domestic entities is permitted.
2000
• Regulations on FDI are brought into compliance with OECD stan-
dards.
• Cattle husbandry and news agencies are partly liberalized.
2001
• Meat wholesaling is partly liberalized.
Present situation: Out of 1,121 industries, 29 remain partially or com-
pletely closed to FDI. There is no limit on the amount that corporations
can invest abroad, but all direct investments require notiﬁcation of the cor-
porations’ banks, and for ﬁnancial, banking, and insurance companies, ac-
ceptance is required by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE).
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also required for purchases of foreign real estate by domestic companies or
purchases of domestic real estate by foreigners. Minimum standards of do-
mestic companies’ foreign exchange earnings must be met in order for
them to establish branches overseas.
Portfolio Investment
1984
• The Korea Fund is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, providing
international investors with an indirect means of investing in the Ko-
rean stock market.
1985
• South Korean ﬁrms are allowed to issue depository notes and war-
rants up to 15 percent of their outstanding share volume provided that
no single foreign entity can acquire more than 3 percent of the capital
by exercising conversion rights.
1987
• The Korea Europe Fund is established, further enabling foreigners to
invest in the stock market.
• Inward remittances greater than US$20,000 are monitored to dis-
courage investments in the stock exchange.
1989
• Foreigners are allowed to trade among themselves. South Korean
shares are permitted to be acquired through the exercise of bond con-
version rights.
• Foreign exchange banks are allowed to issue foreign currency bonds
oﬀshore and to underwrite and trade foreign currency bonds issued by
nonresidents.
1990
• The government allows the three domestic investment trusts each to
establish a US$100 million fund (of which US$60 million is to be
raised abroad) to invest in South Korean companies (70 percent of the
capital) and foreign securities.
1991
• The Korea Asian Fund is established
• Nonresidents are allowed to convert into won up to US$100,000 to in-
vest in development trusts with a maturity of more than two years.
• Securities in foreign currencies are permitted to be issued by residents
to ﬁnance import of inputs and machinery for which no domestic sub-
stitute is available.
• Nonresidents who had acquired South Korean shares through con-
vertible bonds are allowed to trade them in the stock exchange.
512 Marcus Noland1992
• Foreign investment directly in the South Korean stock market by non-
residents subject to ceilings of 3 percent for a particular investor and
10 percent for foreign investors in the aggregate is permitted.
• Investments in stocks by resident foreign ﬁnancial institutions are
subject to the same limits as those of institutions owned by nationals.
• Authorization for the issuance abroad of bonds, callable bonds, war-
rants, and stock depository receipts by residents is simpliﬁed, and re-
ceipts can be maintained in accounts abroad.
1993
• Issues of securities denominated in foreign currency are not subject to
permission but only to reporting requirements; the class of eligible is-
suers is widened to include those with positive cumulative proﬁts over
the past three years.
1994
• The ceiling on nonresidents holdings of individual South Korean
ﬁrms’ capital is raised from 10 percent to 12 percent. Nonresidents’
holdings of individual South Korean public corporations are allowed
up to an 8 percent ceiling.
1995
• The ceiling on nonresidents’ holdings of private South Korean ﬁrms’
capital is raised from 12 percent to 15 percent.
• Brokers are allowed to engage in foreign exchange transactions related
to nonresidents’ investments in the stock market.
• Issuance of exchangeable bonds overseas is permitted, provided that
they do not exceed 15 percent of the ﬁrm’s capital.
• Limits on oﬀshore security issuance by small and medium-sized com-
panies are relaxed.
1996
• Investment in domestic bonds by foreigners is allowed through the
US$100 million Korea Bond Fund listed in London.
• Limits on foreign ownership of listed Korean ﬁrms are raised to 20
percent and 15 percent for private and public enterprises, respectively;
the ceiling on individual ownership is increased to 5 percent.
• Up to 50 percent of won-denominated securities issued by nonresi-
dents can be sold abroad.
1997
• Foreigners can collectively purchase up to 30 percent of convertible
bonds issued by small and medium-sized companies and only 5 per-
cent individually.
• June: Regulations are relaxed so that foreign investors are allowed ac-
cess to nonguaranteed bonds of small and medium-sized companies
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and of conglomerates (up to 30 percent limit of an issue together with
a 6 percent individual limit).
• The issue abroad of won-denominated securities requires approval by
the MOFE. The issue of foreign currency–denominated securities
must be reported to the MOFE.
• December 11: Authorities raise the ceiling on aggregate foreign own-
ership of listed Korean shares from 26 percent to 50 percent and the
individual ceiling from 7 percent to 50 percent; eliminate all limits on
foreign investment in nonguaranteed bonds issued by small and
medium-sized companies; and allow foreign investment in the guar-
anteed corporate bond market (for maturities greater than three years)
with limits at 10 percent and 30 percent for individuals and in aggre-
gate, respectively.
• December 12: Authorities raise aggregate limits for foreign investment
in nonguaranteed corporate (convertible) bonds from 30 percent to 50
percent.
• December 23: Authorities allow foreigners to invest in government
and special bonds, up to the aggregate ceiling of 30 percent, and elim-
inate all individual limits for foreign investment in corporate bonds.
• December 30: Authorities eliminate all foreign investment ceilings for
the government, special, and corporate bond markets, including for
maturities of less than three years; lift the restriction on foreign bor-
rowing of over three years’ maturity; and raise the aggregate ceiling on
foreign investment in Korean equities to 55 percent.
1998
• Restrictions on the amount of foreign investment in Korean equities
are lifted; domestic bond and money markets are opened to foreigners.
1999
• Oﬀshore issuance of securities with a maturity of less than one year by
domestic entities is permitted.
• Issuance of won-denominated and foreign currency–denominated se-
curities by foreign entities is permitted.
• Investment in foreign ﬁnancial and insurance markets by domestic en-
tities is permitted.
Present situation: Ceilings on purchases of Korean stocks remain in place
for twenty-three domestic ﬁrms.
Other Capital Flows
1981
• Issuance of foreign beneﬁciary certiﬁcates by Korean trust companies
is allowed.
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• Some restrictions on foreign loans to domestic ﬁrms are relaxed.
1986
• Regulations on foreign currency loans are tightened.
1987
• The government directs ﬁnancial institutions to repay foreign short-
term borrowing and bank loans that bear “unfavorable conditions.”
Special deposits by the central bank are made at Korean foreign ex-
change banks for this purpose.
1988
• Nonresidents are prohibited from converting in won amounts with-
drawn from their accounts. Sales of foreign currency by nonresidents
to domestic banks are limited to US$10,000.
• Limits on banks’ foreign exchange loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises and export ﬁrms are strictly enforced.
1989
• A limit of US$200 million is set on special foreign currency loans
granted to a ﬁrm during a year.
• Currency loans are now admissible for investment operations abroad,
subject to a ten-year maturity limit and ceilings of 60 percent and 80
percent of the investment for large and small ﬁrms, respectively.
• The amount of foreign currency allowed in the country without noti-
ﬁcation to the tax authorities is raised in two steps to US$10,000.
1990
• Central bank loans for the redemption of the foreign currency loans
by banks and ﬁrms are abolished.
1991
• Limits on foreign currency loans for investments abroad are reduced
to 40 percent and 60 percent of the total for large and small enter-
prises, respectively.
1992
• The maximum amount of loans of overseas investments is increased to
60 percent and 70 percent for large and small enterprises, respectively.
• Residents can issue abroad negotiable certiﬁcates of deposit and com-
mercial papers.
1993
• Nonresidents are allowed to hold won accounts.
• Manufacturing companies can obtain loans in foreign currencies for
all imports of inputs and equipment; the BOK raises the amount of
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loans by domestic banks from US$1 billion to US$4 billion.
1994
• Ceilings are abolished on borrowing by resident corporations and
their foreign branches from nonresident ﬁnancial institutions located
abroad.
• Foreign-ﬁnanced general manufacturing companies are eligible for
short-term overseas borrowing, while the overseas borrowing by for-
eign-ﬁnanced, high-tech ﬁrms is raised to 100 percent of the foreign
capital share.
1995
• Eight leasing companies are allowed to undertake medium- and long-
term borrowing oﬀshore without intermediation from foreign ex-
change banks.
• Direct foreign borrowing by enterprises engaged in social projects and
foreign-ﬁnanced, high-tech ﬁrms is allowed up to 100 percent of cap-
ital (90 percent for large corporations) for redemption of import-
related debts.
• The ratio of foreign currency loans taken by large companies for im-
port of inputs and machinery is lowered to 70 percent of total cost.
1996
• Restrictions on foreign borrowing are eliminated for certain small and
medium-sized ﬁrms.
• Nonresidents are allowed to open won accounts in overseas branches
of domestic banks.
1997
• April: The period for importing on a deferred-payment basis is length-
ened by 30 days for raw materials used in manufacturing export com-
modities for small and medium-sized enterprises. The period is ex-
tended for large enterprises as well in August.
• July: The MOFE abolishes regulations on the usage of long-term
loans with maturities of over ﬁve years brought into the country by
foreign manufacturers.
• Foreign investment funds approved by the MOFE can purchase do-
mestic money market instruments. Other foreign institutions and do-
mestic individuals require the prior approval of the MOFE. The is-
suance abroad of other securities, like certiﬁcates of deposit in foreign
currency denominations, requires the MOFE’s approval.
• Certain forms of trade credit are allowed without prior approval; how-
ever, deferred payments for the import of goods and export advances
(except those by small and medium-sized ﬁrms) are subject to binding
value limits. Export down payments up to 8 percent of the value are al-
lowed for ships and plant building during production.
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foreign borrowing to the MOFE when the maturity exceeds one year
and when the amount is over US$10 million.
• Credits from nonresidents to nonbank residents require prior ap-
proval by the MOFE.
• Foreign-ﬁnanced, high-tech companies can borrow up to 100 percent
of the foreign invested capital with maturity limited to three years.
• Foreign borrowing with a maturity of less than three years is governed
by the Foreign Exchange Act.
• Residents cannot lend abroad without the approval of the MOFE.
1998
• February 16: Authorities removed restrictions on corporate borrow-
ing from abroad up to US$2 million for venture companies.
• Authorities opened up money market instruments issued by nonﬁ-
nancial institutions (commercial papers, commercial bills, and trade
bills) to foreigners without limits.
• The requirement that foreign borrowing from abroad exceed US$1
million is eliminated.
1999
• The Foreign Exchange Management Act is abolished and replaced by
the Foreign Exchange Transaction Act, which liberalizes most current
account transactions. It also authorizes safeguard mechanisms, in-
cluding freezing of transactions; a permission-based transaction sys-
tem; the funneling of foreign currency to the BOK; activation of a
VDR system; and requirement that a certain percentage of capital
ﬂows be deposited in a non-interest-bearing account.
• Overseas short-term borrowing by “ﬁnancially sound” domestic ﬁrms
is permitted.
• Nonresidents are permitted to make deposits and open won-
denominated savings and trust accounts with maturities in excess of
one year.
• The requirement that foreign-invested ﬁrms receive government ap-
proval for intraﬁrm transactions exceeding $1 million is abolished.
2001
• All restrictions are lifted on foreign currency loans to residents by do-
mestic banks.
• The remaining ceilings on current account transactions by individuals
are eliminated.
2002
• Regulations on individuals’ external payments are eased.
Present situation: Requirements for the repatriation of overseas claims,
limits on nonresident won funding aimed at hedge funds, and restrictions
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are still in place. The Foreign Exchange Transactions Act contained sunset
provisions expiring December 31, 2005, relating to the permission system
for certain capital account transactions. This expiring system was replaced
by a streamlined reporting system on January 1, 2006. Sale by nonresidents
of foreign exchange over US$20,000 without documentation is subject to
notiﬁcation requirements. Purchase by nonresidents of foreign exchange
without documentation of previous sale in excess of US$10,000 is subject
to notiﬁcation requirements. Notiﬁcation requirements remain on foreign
currency loans for nonbank ﬁrms, in particular loans in excess of US$30
million. Firms whose debt ratio is greater than their industry average and/
or whose credit rating is below investment grade are considered ﬁnancially
unsound and are subject to special notiﬁcation requirements for short-
term foreign currency borrowing. Exceptions exist for certain general
manufacturing or high-tech industries.
Capital Market Organization
1985
• The underwriting of foreign assets by domestic securities companies is
permitted.
1987
• Foreign exchange banks begin oﬀshore banking at the initiative of the
government.
• Nine additional foreign banks are allowed to enter the trust invest-
ment business.
1993
• Overseas branches of domestic banks are allowed to supply loans to
residents who trade commodities futures and ﬁnancial futures.
1997
• Foreign exchange banks can conduct all form of transactions in the
foreign currency market, including swaps, options, forwards, and fu-
tures, but the terms of the forward transaction between banks and
nonbank customers must be based on bona ﬁde transactions.
• December 29: Restrictions on commercial bank ownership are eased
to encourage foreign investment in domestic ﬁnancial institutions.
The ﬁnancial-sector legislation passed on December 29 abolishes the
4 percent ownership limit for commercial banks. Purchase of bank eq-
uity by foreign banks is now permitted without limit, but requires ap-
proval at three stages: 10 percent, 25 percent, and 31 percent. Domes-
tic ownership above 4 percent is permitted provided that an equal or
larger share is held by a foreign bank.
• Commercial bank open positions in foreign currencies are subject to
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than 15 percent of the equity capital and the oversold position lower
than 10 percent of the equity capital or US$20 million, whichever is
larger; and (b) the spot oversold positions cannot exceed 3 percent of
the equity capital or US$5 million, whichever is larger.
1998
• March 31: Authorities allow foreign banks and brokerage houses to
establish subsidiaries.
1999
• Domestic institutions are permitted to engage in derivative transac-
tions.
• The principle is established under the Foreign Exchange Transaction
Act that any ﬁnancial institution meeting certain requirements need
merely notify MOFE before engaging in foreign exchange–related
business.
2002
• Securities and insurance companies are allowed entry into the inter-
bank market.
Present situation: Sixty-one institutions are recognized as “foreign ex-
change banks” and authorized to engage in foreign exchange transac-
tions for third parties. A larger number of businesses are authorized to
engage in foreign exchange transactions on their own behalf. The over-
all open overbought (oversold) position in foreign currencies of foreign
exchange banks must be lower than 20 percent of the equity capital. A
foreign exchange bank must maintain reserves amounting to a pre-
scribed proportion of its foreign currency deposit liabilities in the form
of foreign currency deposits at the BOK. The current requirements are
5 percent for demand deposits, 2 percent for saving deposits, and 1 per-
cent for foreign currency deposits by nonresidents and other banks. The
banks are also subject to foreign currency mismatch regulations: 80 per-
cent of short-term (less than three months) liabilities must be covered by




• The multiple exchange rate system is uniﬁed; the won is pegged to the
dollar.
1980
• A “multibasket” peg for the won is introduced, determined by the
weighted average of the special drawing rights (SDR) basket and a
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icy” adjustment factor.
1985
• Currency swaps are permitted.
1986
• Regulations on swaps are further liberalized.
1987
• Restrictions on futures and options are lifted. The limit on the forward
contract period is eliminated.
• The ceiling on foreign banks’ swap operations is relaxed by 10 percent.
1988
• The limit on swaps by foreign banks is relaxed again by 10 percent.
1989
• The ceilings on swap operations by foreign banks are relaxed by an-
other 10 percent.
1990
• The Market Average Exchange Rate (MAR) System is adopted, in
which the won is allowed to ﬂoat within certain bands of daily ﬂuctu-
ation. The band is initially set at  0.4 percent.
1991
• The band is widened to  0.6 percent.
1992
• The range of admissible forward exchange contracts is extended.
• The band is widened to  0.8 percent.
1993
• Regulations on forward foreign exchange transactions are relaxed;
ceilings held on foreign exchange deposits payable in domestic cur-
rency are abrogated.
• The band is widened to  1.0 percent.
1994
• The band is widened to  1.5 percent.
1995
• The band is widened to  2.25 percent.
1996
• The yen-won spot and forward market are established.
• Foreign currency–derivative transactions are opened to nonresidents.
Documentation requirements for forward and futures transactions
are eliminated, but transactions still need to be based on real demand.
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10 percent.
• Swaps are allowed for portfolio investments abroad by ﬁnancial and
insurance companies.
1997
• All settlements with other countries can be made in any convertible
currency except the won. Export earnings exceeding US$50,000 must
be repatriated within six months.
• Residents can purchase derivatives through a foreign exchange bank,
but issuance abroad requires MOFE’s approval.
• November 11: The band is widened to  10 percent.
• December 16: South Korea ﬂoats the won.
1999
• The real demand principle for forward and derivative transactions is
abolished, permitting further development of these markets. The Ko-
rea Futures Exchange (KOFEX) is established.
2002
• The Plan for the Development of the Korean Foreign Exchange Mar-
ket, which envisions full liberalization of foreign exchange regulations
by 2011, is announced.
Present situation: The exchange rate system is classiﬁed as independently
ﬂoating in an inﬂation-targeting framework by the IMF. Interventions are
sizable and would appear to go beyond the smoothing function as charac-
terized by the IMF.
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Comment Gita Gopinath
This paper provides a detailed characterization of economic policy events,
particularly those related to international capital ﬂows, in South Korea
from the early 1960s to the present. It describes the policy stance on inter-
nal and external ﬁnancial liberalization in South Korea over this period. It
notes that several years of high growth in South Korea prior to the 1980s
took place in a climate of ﬁnancial repression: only starting in the 1980s
and later were there signs of ﬁnancial liberalization. The paper also dis-
cusses the origins of the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98 and the subsequent re-
forms.
This paper contributes to the literature that identiﬁes turning points in
ﬁnancial liberalization policies in developing countries. A related paper
that performs an analysis of policy changes with respect to ﬁnancial-sector
liberalization and generates an index of ﬁnancial liberalization for several
developing and developed economies is Abiad and Mody (2003). Their in-
dex of ﬁnancial liberalization can potentially take values from 0 to 18, with
higher numbers implying greater levels of ﬁnancial liberalization. Consis-
tent with this paper, they also ﬁnd that until 1980 Korea had extensive con-
trols on domestic ﬁnancial institutions and international capital ﬂows.
Figure 10C.1 indicates this. Further, there is no evidence of substantial
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Gita Gopinath is an assistant professor of economics at Harvard University and a faculty
research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.reversals in the steps toward ﬁnancial liberalization, as seen in ﬁgure 10C.2.
This is contrary to the experience of certain other emerging markets, espe-
cially Argentina, when liberalization measures were adopted in the 1970s
and almost completely reversed following the debt crisis of the 1980s. Also,
comparing the level of ﬁnancial development in Korea to a developed
economy indicates that Korea is still below the frontier.
Country studies of this nature help answer questions about what drives
changes in policy. Is it political events, crisis events, or IMF interventions?
In the case of Korea it appears that at diﬀerent points in time diﬀerent fac-
tors were at work. Phase I, prior to 1980, was a period of extensive capital
controls. This appears to be a result of the political/economic ideology at
the time, which led to a state-led development strategy. A question that can
be raised about this period is why savings rates were so high in Korea. Sav-
ings rates were as high as 40 percent of GDP in the initial decades, which
allowed high levels of investment even when the economy was closed to for-
eign capital ﬂows. To ensure policy-directed lending only, there was a need
to keep domestic and international markets segmented. This involved lim-
iting ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing options to regulated banks and limiting lending in-
stitutions to those that could be controlled. Until 1991, capital was mainly
sourced through banks, and alternative sources of corporate ﬁnance were
suppressed. This period saw the growth of the chaebol,and studies ﬁnd that
indeed the largest ﬁrms had the weakest ﬁnancial structure.
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Fig. 10C.1 Index of ﬁnancial liberalization
Note: For details regarding construction of this index see Abiad and Mody (2003).Phase II, which started around the 1980s, involved stop-and-go liberal-
ization. The move to more liberalization was spurred partly by domestic in-
stitutions’ desire to borrow at lower rates. Foreign ﬁnancial service pro-
viders, especially from the United States, also desired to enter the South
Korean market, and accordingly there was external pressure to open up.
Also, South Korea was attempting to join the OECD. Phase III was the
1997–98 crisis phase, in which IMF-imposed policies were adopted by Ko-
rea. So the reform during this period had a substantial IMF component.
The ﬁnancial crisis in South Korea in 1997–98 has often been blamed on
the short-term nature of capital ﬂows into the country. An important ques-
tion, then, is why capital ﬂows took this form. A country study, like that in
this paper, is a very useful tool to decipher diﬀerent stories. This paper sug-
gests that short-term ﬂows were very much an outcome of government pol-
icy. According to policy, foreign investors were prevented from investing in
the long-term corporate bond market. There were concerns with longer-
term lending because of ownership issues: The government wished to re-
tain control over domestic ﬁnancial institutions, and most of the lending
went through banks. Policy therefore created an incentive to borrow short
term. Further, Basel Accord incentives encouraged lending to South Ko-
rea to take the form of short-term bank lending.
This explanation for short-term ﬂows contrasts with the explanation put
forth by Diamond and Rajan (2001a, 2001b). According to this view, poor
South Korea’s Experience with International Capital Flows 527
Fig. 10C.2 Steady ﬁnancial liberalizationinformation in emerging markets and relationship banking results in for-
eign investors’ primarily lending to banks. This is also the reason why for-
eign investors keep their lending short term: to safeguard themselves
against the risk of bad investments by banks. It was a combination of the
nature of investments being ﬁnanced and lack of foreign investor conﬁ-
dence that resulted in a short-term debt buildup. This hypothesis is pre-
sumably testable given the policy details in this paper.
In the 1990s there was a rise in foreign currency liabilities held by Korean
banks, with currency and maturity mismatches. This meant that an ex-
change rate adjustment would have strong negative eﬀects on bank balance
sheets. The source of the crisis in South Korea has been much debated.
This paper ﬁnds a combination of explanations, including domestic shocks
associated with failures of the chaebol and domestic political turmoil. The
ﬁnancial crisis in other parts of Southeast Asia and the emerging banking
crisis in Japan, which was the principal source of foreign loans to South
Korea, were added problems.
The question of what fundamentally changed during the crisis period in
Korea is an open one. Alternative hypotheses include the view that the cri-
sis was a liquidity crisis. An interesting feature of the crisis episode was the
entry of foreign direct investment into South Korea even during crisis
years. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) ﬁnd evidence that a signiﬁcant portion
of acquisitions took the form of ﬁre sale of assets. That is, domestic ﬁrms
that were liquidity constrained were, all else being equal, more likely to be
acquired during the crisis.
Following the ﬁnancial crisis, Korea took several steps to improve ﬁ-
nancial institutions by introducing new regulatory practices and stan-
dards. The paper notes that while attempts have been made to improve cor-
porate governance, the years of ﬁnancial repression have left a legacy that
makes it diﬃcult to eﬃciently regulate bank lending to large corporations
and to enforce the new regulations. This provides an interesting perspec-
tive into the role of institutions and the persistent eﬀect they have on future
developments in an economy.
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